Fiscal consolidation with tax evasion and corruption by Pappa, Evi et al.
This is the accepted version of the article:
Pappa, Evi; Sajedi, Rana; Vella, Eugenia. «Fiscal consolidation with tax evasion
and corruption». Journal of international economics, Vol. 96 Núm. 1 (2015), p.
s56-s75. DOI 10.1016/j.jinteco.2014.12.004
This version is avaible at https://ddd.uab.cat/record/203789
under the terms of the license
Fiscal Consolidation with Tax Evasion and Corruption
Evi Pappa Rana Sajediy Eugenia Vellaz
July 2, 2014
Abstract
Using cross country data we show that tax evasion and corruption are highly important
for determining the size of the scal multiplier. We introduce these two features in a New
Keynesian model with search and matching frictions, in order to revisit the e¤ects of tax and
expenditure based consolidations. VAR evidence for Italy suggests that expenditure based
consolidations reduce tax evasion signicantly, while tax based ones increase it. In the model,
expenditure cuts reduce demand for both formal and informal goods, and, thus, tax evasion.
Tax hikes induce agents to work and produce more in the informal sector, which is less pro-
ductive, and so imply higher output and welfare losses. We use the model to assess the losses
from the recent scal consolidation plans in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Policy conclu-
sions are sensitive to the models assumptions. Counterfactual exercises highlight the benet
of ghting tax evasion and corruption in economies undertaking 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1 Introduction
When there is an income tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount
of income. Plato, The Republic, Book I, 343-D
The recent scal crisis has excited renewed interest in research examining the macroeconomic
impacts of scal consolidations.1 Besides this increasing attention, two crucial aspects of political
economy, namely the presence of tax evasion and corruption, have been left unnoticed. This is
despite the fact that many countries undertaking such policies are characterized by high levels of
both.2 Tax evasion and corruption often coexist, in various forms, and possibly interact. Existing
evidence suggests a positive correlation between the two (Buehn and Schneider (2012)). At the
same time, there is growing evidence of a rise in tax evasion and corruption since the crisis. For
example, a recent report by the union of the technical sta¤ of the Finance Ministry of Spain
(Gestha (2014)) calculates that the shadow economy has increased by 6.8 pp between 2008 and
2012, reaching 24.6% of GDP. Similarly, a Greek police special task force reported in 2013 that
the number of cases of public corruption increased by 33% between 2011 and 2012.3 The aim of
this paper is to consider these two features and to revisit the e¤ects of expenditure based (EB)
and tax based (TB) scal consolidations on output, unemployment and welfare.
More specically, we will consider tax evasion as synonymous with the shadow economy, which
comprises all market-based, lawful production or trade of goods and services deliberately con-
cealed from public authorities in order to evade either payment of income, value added or other
taxes, or social security contributions; to get around certain labor market standards, such as
minimum wages, maximum working hours, or safety standards; or to avoid compliance with ad-
ministrative procedures, such as lling out paperwork(Buehn and Schneider (2012), p.175-176).
Fiscal policy can a¤ect the size of the shadow economy by exerting an impact on the incentives to
tax evade, both directly through the tax burden, and indirectly through its e¤ects on the regular
economy. Thus, a scal consolidation can have a secondary e¤ect on the economy by causing a
reallocation between the formal and informal sector. We will consider corruption as the embez-
zlement of public funds, the presence of which can have important implications for the ability of
governments to raise tax revenue, and so can alter the e¤ects of scal consolidations.
Many authors have tried to assess whether EB and TB scal consolidations have di¤erent
e¤ects. Using multi-year scal consolidation data for 17 OECD countries over the period 1980-
2005, Alesina et al. (2013) show that EB adjustments have been associated with mild and short-
lived recessions, and in many cases with no recession at all, while TB corrections have been followed
by deep and prolonged recessions. On the theoretical front, Erceg and Lindé (2013) demonstrate
via a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model that, given the limited
accommodation by the central bank and the xed exchange rates under a currency union, an EB
1The implementation of the Maastricht Treaty in the mid 1990s motivated a lot of research on the e¤ects of
consolidations. For examples, see the survey in Perotti (1996).
2See Figure 11 in Appendix A.
3See http://greece.greekreporter.com/2013/04/02/greek-police-public-worker-corruption-soars/
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consolidation depresses output by more than a TB one, but this is reversed in the long run as real
interest and exchange rates adjust towards their exible price levels.
Nonetheless, there is strong evidence that the e¤ects of scal policy are not yet fully under-
stood. Blanchard and Leigh (2013), BL (2013) hereafter, carry out an analysis of the impact of
the recent scal consolidations across 26 OECD countries. They regress the forecast errors of
output growth between 2010-2011 on the planned consolidation of public decit, and nd that the
forecasts of output growth implicitly underestimate the size of scal multipliers. As we demon-
strate in the next section, this implicit underestimation of scal multipliers is more pronounced
in countries with a higher shadow economy and/or corruption, suggesting that these two features
amplify the e¤ects of scal consolidations.
Ideally, having data for tax evasion could help us understand how scal consolidations are
propagated. Luckily, the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) has created and regularly
updated a time series of informal employment, consistent with international standards and, in
particular, with the 1993 System of National Accounts. Italy provides a tting case for this study
for several reasons. First, there is abundant evidence of a large shadow economy in this country,
with estimates varying between 15% and 30% of GDP (see, for example, Boeri and Garibaldi
(2007), Ardizzi et al. (2012), Orsi et al. (2014) and Schneider and Buehn (2012)). Second, Busato
and Chiarini (2004) have shown that incorporating the underground economy in an RBC model
improves the t of the model to the data for Italy. Last but not least, Italy also scores poorly in
international rankings of institutional quality: currently ranked 72nd among 176 countries with
a score of 42/100 in Transparency Internationals Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and 25th
among the 27 EU members in the recently created index for the Quality of Government (see
Charron et al. (2012)).4
We use the ISTAT data on shadow employment to assess the e¤ects of TB and EB consolida-
tions at least in Italy. In particular, we incorporate the shadow employment series in an annual
VAR with government expenditure, tax revenues, a series for the debt-to-GDP ratio, and either
real GDP or the unemployment rate as a measure of economic activity. We identify EB and TB
consolidation shocks using sign restrictions: EB consolidations decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio
with a lag and leave tax revenues unchanged on impact, while TB consolidations also decrease
the debt-to-GDP ratio with a lag and leave government spending unchanged on impact. We
nd that both types of shocks are contractionary, in terms of reducing output and increasing
unemployment. Moreover, TB consolidations cause a signicant increase in tax evasion, while EB
consolidations reduce tax evasion signicantly. Results are robust to the method used to identify
scal shocks, to the number of variables entering the VAR, and to alternative measures of the
scal instruments.
In order to understand the mechanisms which drive these results we introduce tax evasion and
corruption in a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions and endogenous labor
force participation, and reassess the e¤ects of scal consolidations. The economy is divided into
4The CPI is based on a cross-country survey assessing the degree of transparency in public administration.
The latter index accounts for other pillars, such as protection of the rule of law, government e¤ectiveness and
accountability, in addition to corruption.
3
a regular and an underground sector, and none of the transactions in the latter are recorded by
the government authorities. Firms can therefore hire labor in the underground markets to hide
part of their production and evade payroll taxes. Households may also evade personal income
taxation by reallocating their labor supply to the underground sector, but without being entitled
to unemployment benets whilst searching in this sector. In each period of time, there is a positive
probability that irregular employment is detected, in which case the match is dissolved and the
rm pays a ne. Following Erceg and Lindé (2013), we specify either labor tax rates or government
consumption expenditure to react to the deviation of the debt-to-GDP ratio from a target value.
Fiscal consolidation occurs when the target value of debt is hit by an exogenous negative shock.
The model is calibrated to the Italian economy over the period 1982-2006.
According to our model, the presence of tax evasion and corruption amplies the negative
e¤ects of TB consolidations on output, while it mitigates those of EB consolidations. The pres-
ence of corruption implies that a bigger increase in distortionary taxation is needed to achieve
consolidation, and this amplies the negative e¤ects of tax hikes. Tax evasion increases the output
losses after a TB consolidation because both workers and rms, in their e¤ort to avoid taxation,
reallocate more resources to the underground sector, increasing ine¢ ciencies arising from the fact
that this sector is less productive, and also because tax evasion implies that a higher increase of the
tax rate is required to meet the debt target. On the other hand, government spending cuts induce
a fall in tax evasion. Spending cuts generate a negative demand e¤ect that a¤ects both formal
and informal production. Rather than observing a reallocation of labor supply and labor demand
between the two sectors, the EB consolidation induces unemployed jobseekers in both sectors to
leave the labor force. Labor demand is also contracted and as a result both formal and informal
employment fall. Since reductions in government consumption crowd-in private consumption and
decrease the labor supply, EB consolidations typically involve welfare gains, whereas TB consol-
idations are costly in terms of welfare. Relative to standard models, tax evasion and corruption
increase the size of the wealth e¤ect from reductions in government spending and therefore in-
duce smaller output losses and even higher welfare gains from spending cuts, while their presence
implies higher output and welfare losses from TB consolidations.
Given the models ability to match the empirical ndings, we also analyse, through the lens of
our model, the actual consolidation plans in Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Spain,
Portugal) that are characterized by both high corruption and tax evasion. We calibrate our model
for di¤erent economies and show how the recent scal consolidations a¤ect tax evasion in each
country according to our model. We then assess the size of output, unemployment and welfare
losses from the simulated consolidations. The higher levels of the debt-to-GDP ratio in Italy and
Greece imply that the required changes in decit are larger in these countries. As a result, the
model predicts that the output losses and increases in unemployment and the shadow economy
are more pronounced in Greece and Italy. In terms of welfare, results depend on the assumptions
one is willing to accept about the composition of spending and population in these economies. If
we assume government spending to be unproductive and agents identical in the economy, Italy
stands out as the Southern European country most negatively a¤ected by scal austerity, the
other three countries gain from scal consolidations in terms of welfare. If we are willing to
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accept that a big part of the population is nancially constrained in these economies, then scal
consolidations imply welfare losses in all countries, with Greece standing out as the biggest loser.
Finally, if we believe that parts of the spending cuts involve utility enhancing goods, then again
the model predicts welfare losses from the consolidations for all countries, with Spain su¤ering
the least because of its low debt burden.
Many policy discussions have been centered around combating both tax evasion and corruption.
For example, in May 2013, in Ljubljana, socialists and democrats in the European Parliament
organized an event focusing on corruption and tax evasion. We perform a counterfactual exercise
and study what would be the losses from scal consolidations if the Southern European countries
were capable of reducing the degree of corruption and tax evasion in their economies. We nd
that both battles are worth ghting. A reduction in corruption and tax evasion mitigates the
losses from scal consolidations. Following the conclusions of our policy analysis we can humbly
paraphrase the quote of Plato: When there is a corrupt government and an income tax, both the
just and the unjust man will pay more, with the just man paying the lions share on the same
amount of income. Policymakers should realize this and take immediate action.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we present empirical
evidence to motivate our work. In Section 3 we rst present the workhorse model and then discuss
the main theoretical results. Section 4 presents the policy exercises and Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we rst extend the BL (2013) cross country regressions, exploiting the available
estimates for corruption and the share of shadow output in total GDP to investigate their e¤ects on
scal policy outcomes. We then use the ISTAT data on shadow employment in Italy to run VAR
regressions to further examine the e¤ects of EB and TB consolidations on output, unemployment
and shadow employment.
2.1 A First Look at the Data
To motivate our study, we replicate the BL (2013) regressions, controlling for the size of the
shadow economy and the extent of public corruption. For the size of the shadow economy we use
estimates from Elgin and Öztunal¬(2012), while for corruption we use the Corruption Perception
Index (CPI) from Transparency International.5 We separate the 26 European countries considered
by BL (2013) into two groups with a high and low shadow economy, or corruption, respectively,
by using a two-mean clustering algorithm to endogenously group the countries.6 We then add,
5The results are robust to using other estimates, such as Schneider and Buehn (2012) for the shadow economy,
or the World Banks Control of Corruption Index for corruption.
6The high shadow economygroup comprises Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain, while the low shadow economygroup includes Austria, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovakia and
the UK. The high corruptiongroup comprises Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain, while the low corruptiongroup includes Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
UK.
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Table 1: Blanchard & Leigh (2013) Regressions with Additional Controls
Dependent Variable: Forecast Error of GDP growth
1 2 3 4
REGRESSORS (Baseline)
Planned Fiscal Consolidation -1.095*** -0.670** -0.550** -0.618**
(0.255) (0.268) (0.259) (0.268)
Interaction with:
High Shadow Economy -0.761**
(0.351)
High Corruption -0.990***
(0.333)
High Shadow Economy -0.900**
and Corruption (0.351)
Constant 0.775* 0.918** 0.964** 0.925*
(0.383) (0.414) (0.415) (0.450)
Observations 26 26 26 23
R-squared 0.496 0.557 0.600 0.607
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p  0:01; p  0:05; p  0:1
to the baseline regression of BL (2013), a dummy which is equal to one for the high corruption
and tax evasion group. Finally, we also run the same regression using the intersection of the two
groupings; in this case we drop three countries which do not fall into the same group across the
two indices.7 The results are shown in Table 1.
The rst column replicates the baseline result of BL (2013). The planned scal consolidation
variable is signicant at 1% and has a coe¢ cient of -1.095, implying that for every additional
percentage point of scal consolidation as a percentage of GDP, output was 1 percent lower than
forecast (BL (2013), p.8). Whilst this coe¢ cient is still signicant at 5% when the dummy
variables are included, we see that the coe¢ cients are much lower in absolute value, implying
that for countries with a low shadow economy and public corruption, the forecasts were more
accurate. On the other hand, the interaction term is always signicant, showing that there is a
signicant di¤erence in the coe¢ cient across the two groups. The total coe¢ cient on the planned
7An alternative way of carrying out this analysis would be to include the cross-section of the indices directly as
controls in the regression. We have chosen to use the dummy variable approach because, although we have robust
groupings of countries into high and low tax evasion and corruption, there is not enough cross-sectional variation
in either index to add them directly in the regression, and also because both measures are estimated raising issues
of generated regressor bias for this exercise.
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scal consolidation is -1.431 for the High Shadow Economy group, -1.540 for the High Corruption
group, and -1.518 for the High Shadow Economy and Corruption group. In all cases, this is well
above the baseline BL (2013) coe¢ cient in absolute value, suggesting that the forecast errors were
signicantly and systematically larger in these countries. In other words, the implicit underesti-
mation of scal multipliers is more pronounced in countries with a higher shadow economy and/or
corruption, suggesting that these two features amplify the e¤ects of scal consolidations.
Following the analysis of BL (2013), we run the same regressions for the components of GDP
and unemployment in order to understand which components of demand are more signicantly
a¤ected by the presence of these two features. Table 2 summarizes the results. We see that the
presence of corruption and tax evasion is particularly important for the e¤ects of consolidations
on the unemployment rate and investment, but not for consumption, nor for exports or imports.
2.2 VAR Evidence
In this section we present VAR regressions for Italy, for which we have annual time series available
for the size of the underground sector. The Italian statistical o¢ ce (ISTAT (2010)), calculates
the number of employees working in the informal sector using the discrepancies between reported
employment from household surveys and rm surveys. We use the percentage of informal workers
in total workers as the measure of the size of the shadow economy, and enter this into a VAR with
GDP, government nal consumption expenditures, tax rates (calculated as the total tax burden
over GDP) and government debt-to-GDP ratio.8 We also run the same VAR replacing GDP with
the unemployment rate.
We use a set of minimal sign restrictions to identify the scal disturbances. We identify two
scal shocks, a government spending and a tax shock that both decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio.
To do so, we impose that the debt-to-GDP ratio falls with a lag following both shocks. We use zero
restrictions that ensure that in each case only one instrument is active during the consolidation.
In other words, to identify an EB consolidation we assume that tax rates do not move on impact
after the shock, while the opposite is assumed in the case of a TB consolidation. The responses of
output, unemployment and shadow employment are left unrestricted. The sign restrictions used
are summarised in Table 3.9
The resulting impulse response functions for the VAR with output are shown in Figure 1.10
In the case of an EB consolidation both output and shadow employment decrease signicantly at
all horizons. For a TB consolidation, output does not fall on impact but is signicantly negative
8The ISTAT data is available at http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/39522. All other data are taken from the
AMECO database of the European Commission. We use annual data from 1980-2006, and de-trend the data by
including in the VAR a cubic trend and a dummy for 1998 (the start of the European Monetary Union). We also
include interest rates as an exogenous variable in order to control for the e¤ects of monetary policy. Given the small
sample size, we use Bayesian methods to estimate the VAR.
9As a robustness check, we run the VAR in the following order: government consumption expenditures, GDP,
shadow employment, tax rates and debt-to-GDP, and use the Cholesky decomposition to identify the shocks. The
results are shown in Appendix A, and are in line with the sign restrictions. These results need to be taken with
caution since it is very di¢ cult to justify the zero restrictions assumed on the reaction of the scal instrument to
output changes on annual data.
10For ease of exposition we show only the responses of the unrestricted variables in each case; the other responses
are in line with the sign restrictions imposed and are presented in Appendix A .
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Table 3: Sign Restrictions
Variable: Govt Expenditure Tax Rate Debt-to-GDP
Shock: t = 0; 1 t = 0; 1 t = 2
Expenditure Cut  0 
Tax Hike 0 + 
in the long run, and there is a signicant rise in shadow employment in the second period.
The results of the VAR with the unemployment rate are shown in Figure 2. We see that the
unemployment rate rises signicantly after both types of consolidation, and, as before, shadow
employment falls in the case of an EB consolidation, and rises in the case of a TB consolidation.
We have also performed exercises, that we do not present here for economy of space, in which
we dene the scal variables in the VAR as percentages of GDP, we replace GDP with a common
factor for economic activity and we include alternative series for the size of the shadow economy
provided by Elgin and Öztunah (2012). Results are robust to these changes.
Hence, the data robustly suggests that, for Italy, a consolidation through expenditure cuts
leads to a fall in shadow employment, whilst a consolidation through tax hikes increases shadow
employment. In the next section we construct a DSGE model with tax evasion and corruption and
try to replicate these empirical ndings in order to understand the transmission of scal shocks
when the economy operates under such frictions.
3 The Model
We consider a DSGE model with search and matching frictions, endogenous labor decisions, and
sticky prices in the short run. Given that, in Section 2, we found no evidence that the presence
of corruption and tax evasion is important for understanding the e¤ects of scal consolidation
on exports or imports, we consider a closed-economy model, thus, keeping the setup as simple
as possible. The economy is divided into the formal and the informal sector, and none of the
transactions occurring in the latter are recorded by government authorities. Firms therefore use
factors from underground markets to hide part of their production for tax evasion purposes. There
are two types of rms in the economy: (i) competitive intermediate rms that use capital and labor
to produce intermediate goods with two di¤erent technologies: one associated with the regular
sector and the other with the underground sector, and (ii) monopolistic competitive retailers that
use all intermediate varieties to produce di¤erentiated retail goods, which are then aggregated
into a nal consumption good. Price rigidities arise at the retail level, while search frictions
occur in the production of intermediate goods. In each period of time, intermediate rms face
a probability of being inspected by the scal authorities and convicted of tax evasion, in which
case they pay a penalty, and the employment match is terminated. There is a representative
household consisting of formal and informal employees, unemployed jobseekers and labor force
non-participants. Formal employment is subject to an income tax, whilst this tax is evaded by
9
Figure 1: Empirical IRFs - Output and Shadow Employment
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Figure 2: Empirical IRFs - Unemployment Rate and Shadow Employment
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
x 10-4
Unemployment Rate
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
-15
-10
-5
0
5
x 10-4
Shadow Employment (%)
Expenditure Based Consolidation
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
x 10-4
Unemployment Rate
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
x 10-4
Shadow Employment (%)
Tax Based Consolidation
11
the employees of the shadow economy. As well as their labor income, the household rents out
its private capital to the intermediate rms, and purchases the nal consumption good. The
government collects taxes from the regular sector, embezzles a fraction of the revenues, and uses
the remainder to nance public expenditures and the provision of unemployment benets.
3.1 Labor market
Following the literature on labor market frictions, we account for the imperfections and transaction
costs in the labor market by assuming that jobs are created through a matching function. For
j = F; I denoting the formal and informal sectors, we let jt be the number of vacancies and u
j
t
the number of jobseekers in each sector. We assume matching functions of the form:
mjt = 
j
1(
j
t )
2(ujt )
1 2 (1)
where we allow for di¤erences in the e¢ ciency of the matching process, j1, in the two sectors. In
each sector we can dene the probability of a jobseeker being hired,  hjt , and of a vacancy being
lled,  fjt , as well as the market tightness, 
j
t , as follows:
 hjt 
mjt
ujt
;  fjt 
mjt
jt
; jt 
jt
ujt
In each period, jobs in the formal sector are destroyed at a constant fraction, F , and mFt new
matches are formed. The law of motion f formal employment, nFt , is thus given by:
nFt+1 = (1  F )nFt +mFt (2)
In the informal sector there is an exogenous fraction of jobs destroyed in each period, I , as well
as a probability that an informal employee might lose their job due to an audit, which we denote
by . Therefore the law of motion of informal employment, nIt , is given by:
nIt+1 = (1    I)nIt +mIt (3)
3.2 Households
The representative household is made up of a continuum of innitely lived agents. The members
of the household derive utility from leisure, which corresponds to the fraction of members that
are out of the labour force, lt, and a consumption bundle, cct, dened as:
cct = [1(ct)
2 + (1  1)(gt)2 ]
1
2 (4)
where gt denotes public consumption, which is taken as exogenous by the household, and
ct =

1(c
F
t )
2 + (1  1)(cIt )2
 1
2 (5)
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is the private consumption bundle, made up of the consumption goods produced in the formal
and informal sector. The elasticity of substitution between the private and public goods is given
by 11 2 .
11 Similarly, the elasticity of substitution between the formal and informal consumption
goods is given by 11 2 . The instantaneous utility function is given by:
U(cct; lt) =
cc1 t
1   + 
l1 't
1  ' (6)
where  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,  > 0 is the relative preference
for leisure, and ' is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
At any point in time a fraction nFt (n
I
t ) of the representative households members are formal
(informal) employees. Campolmi and Gnocchi (2014), Brückner and Pappa (2012) and Bermper-
oglou et al. (2014) have added a labor force participation choice in New Keynesian models of
equilibrium unemployment. Following Ravn (2008), the participation choice is modelled as a
trade-o¤ between the cost of giving up leisure and the prospect of nding a job. In particular, the
household chooses the fraction of the unemployed actively searching for a job, ut, and the fraction
which are out of the labor force and enjoying leisure, lt, so that:
nFt + n
I
t + ut + lt = 1 (7)
The household chooses the fraction of jobseekers searching in each sector: a share st of unemployed
looks for a job in the underground sector, while the remainder, (1  st), seek employment in the
formal sector. That is, uIt  stut and uFt  (1  st)ut.
The household owns the capital stock, which evolves over time according to:
kt+1 = it + (1  )kt   !
2

kt+1
kt
  1
2
kt (8)
where  is a constant depreciation rate and !2

kt+1
kt
  1
2
kt are adjustment costs.
The intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
(1 +  ct)ct + it +
Bt+1t+1
Rt
 rtkt + (1  nt )wFt nFt + wIt nIt +$uFt +Bt + pt   Tt (9)
where t  pt=pt 1 is the gross ination rate, wjt ; j = F; I , are the real wages in the two sectors, rt
is the real return to capital, $ denotes unemployment benets, available only in the formal sector
(see Boeri and Garibaldi (2007)), Bt is the real government bond holdings, Rt is the gross nominal
interest rate, pt are the prots of the monopolistically competitive rms, discussed below, and 
c
t ,
nt and Tt represent taxes on private consumption, labor income and lump-sum taxes respectively.
The household maximises expected lifetime utility subject to (1) for each j, (2), (3), (7), (8),
and (9). Taking as given njt , they choose ut, st (which together determine lt) and n
j
t+1, as well as
ct, kt+1 and Bt+1.
11Recall the following limiting cases: when 2 approaches one, ct and gt are perfect substitutes. They are instead
perfect complements if 2 tends to minus innity. 2 = 0 nests the Cobb-Douglas specication.
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It is convenient to dene the marginal value to the household of having an additional member
employed in the two sectors, as follows:
V hnF t = ctw
F
t (1  nt )  l 't + (1  F )nF t (10)
V hnI t = ctw
I
t   l 't + (1    I)nI t (11)
where nF t, nI t and ct are the multipliers in front of (2), (3) and (9) respectively.
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3.3 Production
3.3.1 Intermediate goods rms
Intermediate goods are produced with two di¤erent technologies:
xFt = (A
F
t n
F
t )
1 F (kt)
F
(12)
xIt = (A
I
tn
I
t )
1 I (13)
where AFt > A
I
t denote total factor productivities. That is, we assume that the informal produc-
tion technology is less e¢ cient and uses labor inputs only (see e.g. Busato and Chiarini (2004)).
More importantly, since households consume a nal good, we are also implicitly assuming that
the formal and informal goods are perfect substitutes. There is no di¤erentiation between goods.
Final goods are produced with some intermediates that are not declared by the rms.
Firms maximize the discounted value of future prots, subject to (2) and (3), taking the
number of workers currently employed in each sector, njt ; as given and choosing the number of
vacancies posted in the current period in each sector, jt , so as to employ the desired number
of workers next period, njt+1. Here, rms adjust employment by varying the number of workers
(extensive margin) rather than the number of hours per worker (intensive margin). According to
Hansen (1985), most of the employment uctuations arise from movements in this margin. Firms
also decide the amount of the private capital, kt , needed for production. They face a probability,
 , of being inspected by the scal authorities, convicted of tax evasion and forced to pay a penalty,
which is a fraction,  , of their total revenues. Hence the problem of an intermediate rm is:
Q(njt ) = max
kt;
j
t
n
(1  ) pxt (xFt + xIt )  (1 +  st )wFt nFt   wIt nIt   rtkt   FFt   IIt + Et
h
t;t+1Q(n
j
t+1)
io
(14)
where pxt is the relative price of intermediate goods, 
s
t is a payroll tax, 
j is a cost associated
with posting a new vacancy in each sector j, and t;t+1   Ucct+1Ucct = 

cct+1
cct
 
is a discount
12The rst order conditions of the households problem and the derivations of equations (10) and (11) are presented
in the Appendix.
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factor. The rst-order conditions are:
rt = (1  ) pxt

FxFt
kt

(15)
F
 fFt
= Ett;t+1
"
(1  ) pxt+1(1  F )
xFt+1
nFt+1
  (1 +  st+1)wFt+1 +
(1  F )F
 fFt+1
#
(16)
I
 fIt
= Ett;t+1
"
(1  ) pxt+1(1  I)
xIt+1
nIt+1
  wIt+1 +
(1    I)I
 fIt+1
#
(17)
According to (15)-(17), the net value of the marginal product of private capital should equal the
real rental rate and the marginal cost of opening a vacancy in each sector j should equal the
expected marginal benet. The latter includes the net value of the marginal product of labor
minus the wage, augmented by the payroll tax in the formal sector, plus the continuation value.
Again for convenience we present the expected values of the marginal formal and informal job
for the intermediate rm:
V f
nF t
 @Q
@nFt
= (1  ) pxt (1  F )
xFt
nFt
  (1 +  st )wFt +
(1  F )F
 fFt
(18)
V f
nI t
 @Q
@nIt
= (1  ) pxt (1  I)
xIt
nIt
  wIt +
(1    I)I
 fIt
(19)
3.3.2 Retailers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by i on the unit interval.
Retailers buy intermediate goods and di¤erentiate them with a technology that transforms one
unit of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods, and thus the relative price of intermediate
goods, pxt , coincides with the real marginal cost faced by the retailers. Let yit be the quantity of
output sold by retailer i. The nal consumption good can be expressed as:
yt =
Z 1
0
(yit)
 1
 di
 
 1
(20)
where  > 1 is the constant elasticity of demand for retail goods. The nal good is sold at its
price, pt =
hR 1
0 p
1 
it di
i 1
1 
. The demand for each intermediate good depends on its relative price
and aggregate demand:
yit =

pit
pt
 
yt (21)
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that in any given period each retailer can reset her price with
a xed probability (1  ). Hence, the price index is:
pt =

(1  )(pt )1  + (pt 1)1 
 1
1  (22)
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The rms that are able to reset their price, pit, choose it so as to maximize expected prots given
by:
Et
1X
s=0
st;t+s(p

it   pxt+s)yit+s
The resulting expression for pit is:
pit =

  1
Et
P1
s=0 
st;t+sp
x
t+syit+s
Et
P1
s=0 
st;t+syit+s
(23)
3.4 Government
The governments expenditures consist of consumption purchases and unemployment benets,
whilst their revenue comes from the collected nes and the payroll, consumption, and labor income
taxes, as well as the lump-sum taxes. The government decit is therefore dened by:
DFt = gt +$u
F
t   (1  TR)TRt   pxt (xFt + xIt ) (24)
where TRt  (nt +  st )wFt nFt +  ctct +Tt represents the tax revenues and 0  TR < 1 denotes the
embezzlement rate in the presence of corruption in the economy.
The government budget constraint is dened by:
bt +
DFt
yt
= R 1t bt+1t+1g
y
t+1 (25)
where bt = Btyt is the debt-to-GDP ratio and g
y
t+1 is the growth rate of GDP.
We assume transfers, Tt, ;  st ; and 
c
t are xed at their steady-state level. Therefore the
government potentially has the following scal instruments 	 2 fg; ng, in line with Erceg and
Lindé (2013). Although we have tried to incorporate various types of distortionary taxation in our
framework, we present results for the varying labor tax only, since scal consolidations through
payroll tax hikes have very similar e¤ects in our model and since consumption tax hikes, though
they have di¤erent e¤ects from the other two types of taxes, do not constitute the major source
of tax revenues in any of the economies we study.
We consider each instrument separately, assuming that if one is active, the others remain xed
at their steady-state levels. Following Erceg and Lindé (2013), we assume scal rules of the form:
	t = 	
(1 	0) 		0t 1 expf(1  	0)[	1(bt   bt ) + 	2(bt+1  bt+1)]g (26)
where bt is the target value for this ratio and follows an AR(2) process:
log bt+1   log bt = b + 1(log bt   log bt 1)  2 log bt + "bt (27)
where "bt is a white noise process with variance ".
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3.5 Closing the model
Monetary Policy There is an independent monetary authority that sets the nominal interest
rate as a function of current ination according to the rule:
Rt = R expf(t   1)g (28)
where R is the steady-state value of the nominal interest rate.
Goods Markets Total output must equal private and public demand. The resource constraint
for output is thus given by:
yt = ct + it + gt + 
FFt + 
IIt + 
TRTRt (29)
where the last term represents the resource costs in the economy due to corruption.13
The aggregate price index, pt, is given by (22) and (23). The return on private capital, rt,
adjusts so that the capital demanded by the intermediate goods rm, given by (15), is equal to
the stock held by the household.
Bargaining over wages Wages in both sectors are determined by ex post (after matching)
Nash bargaining. Workers and rms split rents and the part of the surplus they receive depends
on their bargaining power. For j = F; I we denote by #j 2 (0; 1) the rmsbargaining power in
sector j. The Nash bargaining problem is to maximize the weighted sum of log surpluses:
max
wjt
n
(1  #j) log V hnjt + #j log V fnjt
o
where V h
njt
and V f
njt
are dened in equations (10), (11), (18) and (19). As shown in Appendix B.3,
wages are given by:
wFt =
(1  #F )
(1 +  st )
 
(1  ) pxt (1  F )
xFt
nFt
+
(1  F )F
 fFt
!
+
#F
ct(1  nt )

l 't  (1 F )nF t

(30)
wIt = (1 #I)
 
(1  ) pxt (1  I)
xIt
nIt
+
(1    I)I
 fIt
!
+
#I
ct

l 't   (1  I)nI t

(31)
3.6 Calibration
We calibrate the model using annual data on the Italian economy over the period 1982-2006.14
Table 4 displays the values used for the di¤erent parameters. We calibrate the labor force partici-
pation and unemployment rate in the formal sector to match the observed average values from the
data. Thus we set o¢ cial labor force participation, lf = nF + uF , equal to 60% and the o¢ cial
13See Appendix B.2 for full derivations.
14Details of the calibration exercise are in Appendix C.
17
Table 4: Calibration Values
Parameter Description Full Model
AF Formal Sector TFP 1
AI Informal Sector TFP 0.25
I Informal Sector Production Function Parameter 0.80
F Formal Sector Capital Share 0.34
b Debt-to-GDP Ratio 1.03
 Discount Factor 0.96
g0, g1, g2 Fiscal Policy Rules Parameters - Expenditure 0.5, 3.5, 2.0
n0, n1, n2 Fiscal Policy Rules Parameters - Tax Rates 0.8, 15, 12
 Price Stickiness 0.25
DF
y Decit-to-GDP Ratio -0.04
 Depreciation Rate 0.088
" Price Elasticity of Demand 5
g
y Government Expenditure-to-GDP Ratio 0.11
 Inverse Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution 2
F Formal Sector Vacancy Costs 0.14
F
wF
Vacancy Costs/Wage 0.22
I Informal Sector Vacancy Costs 0.13
k
y Capital-to-GDP 2.09
lf  nF + uF O¢ cial Labor Force Participation 0.6
I1 Informal Sector Matching E¢ ciency 0.18
F1 Formal Sector Matching E¢ ciency 0.85
2 Elasticity of Matching to Vacancies 0.7
nI
n Share of Informal Employment to Total 0.13
! Capital Adjustment Costs 3
 Relative Utility from Leisure 0.04
TR Embezzlement Rate 0.2
 fI Probability of Filling a Vacancy - Informal Sector 0.05
 fF Probability of Filling a Vacancy - Formal Sector 0.96
 hI Probability of Finding a Job - Informal Sector 0.85
 hF Probability of Finding a Job - Formal Sector 0.63
 Auditing Probability 0.02
1, 2 Debt-to-GDP Target Parameters 0.85, 0.0001
s Share of Informal Jobseekers to Total 0.11
I Exogenous Job Destruction Rate in Informal Sector 0.0545
F Exogenous Job Destruction Rate in Formal Sector 0.07
n Labor Income Tax Rate 0.4
 s Payroll Tax Rate 0.16
 c Consumption Tax Rate 0.18
u
1 l Actual Unemployment Rate 0.09
uF
lf O¢ cial Unemployment Rate 0.1
' Inverse Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply 2
$
wF
Replacement Rate 0.35
#I Informal Sector Firms Bargaining Power 0.81
#F Formal Sector Firms Bargaining Power 0.22
wI
wF
Formal/Informal Wage Di¤erentials 0.93
yI
y Share of Underground Ouput in Total 0.37
 Taylor Rule Parameter 1.1
 Porportional Fine in Case of Auditing 0.3
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unemployment rate to 10%. We x the separation rate, F , equal to 0:07. Since there is no exact
estimate for the value of the formal vacancy-lling probability,  fF , in the literature, we use what
is considered as standard by setting it equal to 0:96. We set the matching elasticity with respect
to vacancies, 2, equal to 0:7, close to the estimate for Italy in Peracchi and Viviano (2004).
The capital depreciation rate, , is set equal to 0:088. Following the literature, we set the
discount factor, , equal to 0:96. The elasticity of demand for intermediate goods, , is set such
that the gross steady-state markup,  1 , is equal to 1:25, and the price of the nal good is
normalized to one. The TFP parameter in the formal sector is normalized to one, AF = 1 and
the capital share F = 0:34. The probability of audit and the fraction of total prots paid as a
ne in the event of an audit are set as follows:  = 0:02, which is close to the value used in Boeri
and Garibaldi (2007), and  = 0:3. We set the vacancy costs in the formal sector F = 0:14 and
the payroll tax rate  s = 0:16, close to the value in Orsi et al. (2014).
In the informal sector, we assume that TFP is lower relative to the informal sector and set AI =
0:25. Using the ISTAT data, we set the share of underground employment to total employment
equal to 0:13. We set the value of I equal to 0:8. We set the exogenous job destruction rate in
the informal sector I = 0:0545 and set the probability of lling a vacancy in the informal sector
 fI = 0:05 and the vacancy cost in the informal sector I = 0:13.
Next, we set the replacement rate, $
wF
, equal to 0:35 close to the estimates in Martin (1996),
also used by Fugazza and Jacques (2004). Government spending as a share of GDP and the
tax rates are set as follows: gy = 11%, 
n = 0:4, in line with Orsi et al. (2014), and  c = 0:18.
The steady state debt-to-GDP ratio is taken from the data, b = 103%. We set the corruption
parameter TR = 0:2.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1 , is set equal to 0:5 and the inverse Frisch
elasticity, ', equals 2. Finally, we set the ination targeting parameter in the Taylor rule,  = 1:1,
the capital adjustment costs ! = 3 and the price-stickiness parameter  = 0:25. The scal policy
parameters are set so as to achieve a 5% drop in the debt-to-GDP target 10 periods after a debt
shock.
3.7 Results
We now present the impulse responses following a negative debt-target shock. We compare the
e¤ects of a 5% reduction in the desired long-run debt target, which is achieved after 10 years,
either through a fall in consumption expenditure or a hike in the tax rates.
3.7.1 Benchmark Model
In order to understand how tax evasion and corruption a¤ect the transmission of scal shocks,
we begin by analysing the response of the macroeconomy in a standard model where those two
features are absent. The theoretical impulse responses are presented in Figure 3.
The consolidation carried out with a fall in government spending has two channels. First,
there is a negative demand e¤ect, leading to a fall in labor demand, which is translated into
a fall in vacancies. Second, there is a positive wealth e¤ect for the household, which increases
19
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consumption and investment and reduces labor force participation. Given the drop in both labor
demand and supply, employment falls and the wage increases. Output falls in the short run, but
increases in the medium and long run because of the increase in investment, which is translated
into an increase in the capital stock. The unemployment rate reects the movement in the number
of jobseekers, which falls on impact, but then increases as employment adjusts.
When the scal consolidation is carried out through labor tax hikes, there is a negative wealth
e¤ect for the household which reduces consumption. The fall in consumption induces a fall in
labor demand, expressed through a drop in vacancies. However, as the return from employment
falls, there is a substitution e¤ect which outweighs the wealth e¤ect, and there is again a decrease
in labor force participation. Employment and output fall, and the responses are signicantly
larger and more persistent than in the case of spending cuts, given the delayed drop in investment
and, hence, capital.
Thus, the benchmark model conrms recent empirical evidence according to which EB con-
solidations are accompanied by mild and short-lived recessions, while TB consolidations lead to
more prolonged and deep recessions (see Alesina et al. (2013)).
3.7.2 Model with Shadow Economy and Corruption
Next, we perform the same analysis for the economy with an underground sector and corruption.
Figure 4 depicts the formal sector and scal variables in this modied model, and Figure 5 shows
the underground sector.
First, we see from Figure 4 that the qualitative response of the formal sector is comparable
with that of the benchmark model. For the TB consolidation there is an additional channel
now at play as unemployed jobseekers reallocate their labor supply and the intermediate rms
reallocate their labor demand from the formal to the informal sector. Tax hikes provide direct
incentives for jobseekers to reallocate their search towards the underground sector because of the
higher tax rates associated with formal employment. At the same time, intermediate rms nd it
protable to reallocate the posted vacancies towards the underground sector because of the fall
in the informal wage, as shown in Figure 5. Consequently, employment and production in the
shadow economy increase.
The negative demand e¤ect from spending cuts a¤ects both formal and informal production.
Rather than observing a reallocation of labor supply and labor demand between the two sectors,
we see that unemployed jobseekers in both sectors decide to leave the labor force. Labor demand
is again contracted and as a result, formal and informal employment fall, replicating the responses
of the underground economy to a spending cut we observed for Italy in Subsection 2.2.
3.7.3 Comparisons and Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 6 shows the response of output, the unemployment rate and welfare for the benchmark
model and the model with tax evasion and corruption, for EB and TB consolidations separately, as
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well as a mixed consolidation in which we allow both policy instruments to move simultaneously.15
We x the relative contribution of expenditure cuts and revenue enhancements to the reduction
in decit, based on the estimates of OECD (2012), which contains details of the recent scal
consolidation plans for many OECD countries. For Italy the reported share of expenditure cuts
in the consolidation plans is around 50%.
For spending cuts, shown in the top panel, we see that the presence of the shadow economy
yields smaller short run losses of output and decreases the unemployment rate at all horizons.
At the same time, consumption increases by more, and labor force participation falls by more,
relative to the benchmark case without tax evasion and corruption. This seems to suggest that
the presence of tax evasion and corruption amplies the wealth e¤ect. This is due to the fact
that, when tax evasion and corruption are present, the tax adjustments required to achieve a given
change in decit are larger, and so, following a spending cut, taxes in the future are expected to
fall by more. The amplication of the wealth e¤ect increases the crowding-in of the private sector
and reduces the negative demand e¤ect of the scal contraction on output and unemployment.
We also see that in both models the EB consolidation implies welfare gains, and that allowing
for tax evasion and corruption increases welfare from EB consolidations. This is simply because
of the amplication of the wealth e¤ect, which increases the crowding-in of private consumption
and the reduction of labor force participation.
For tax hikes, shown in the middle panel, we see that the presence of corruption and tax
evasion amplies the output losses for many horizons, as the recession caused in the formal sector
is deeper. After the impact period, the rise in the o¢ cial unemployment rate is amplied. Finally,
we see that TB consolidation leads to welfare losses, because of the fall in consumption, which
are amplied by the presence of tax evasion and corruption.
For the mixed consolidation, depicted in the bottom panel, we see that, similarly to the case
of TB consolidation, the output losses and the increases in unemployment are amplied in the
presence of tax evasion and corruption. This is in line with the evidence from our extension of
the BL (2013) regressions in Section 2. Furthermore, the initial welfare gains are mitigated, but
this is reversed after 6 years.
Whilst the e¤ects of TB consolidations are robust to a broad set of parameter values, the
e¤ects of EB consolidations might depend crucially on some modelling assumptions. For instance,
spending cuts can result in welfare losses if government expenditures are assumed to be utility
enhancing. To investigate this, we conduct a sensitivity analysis by setting 1 = 0:85 and 2 =
 0:25, so that private and public spending are complements. Results from an EB consolidation
under this scenario are depicted in the top panel of Figure 7 in comparison to the case of wasteful
government spending.16 We see that output and unemployment e¤ects are mitigated, while, as
expected, the response of welfare is reversed.
In addition, the presence of rule of thumb (ROT) consumers in the economy may imply smaller
15Welfare is computed as per-period steady state consumption equivalents. IRFs of all other variables are included
in Appendix A.
16Note that, for comparison purposes, in all our exercises we adjust the parameters of the policy rules so that the
debt target is met after 10 years.
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Figure 6: Comparison of Benchmark and Full Model
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Figure 7: Sensitivity for Expenditure Based Consolidations in the Full Model
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Table 5: Calibrated Values
Greece Italy Spain Portugal
Informal Employment (% Total Employment) 14 13 12.5 12.5
Embezzlement Rate 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.10
Unemployment Rate 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.07
Labor Force Participation Rate 0.64 0.60 0.65 0.70
Replacement Rate 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.35
Expenditure Share in Policy Mix 0.52 0.50 0.66 0.54
Government Consumption Spending (% GDP) 5 11 6 5
Debt (% GDP) 110 103 40 56
welfare gains from spending cuts, since these agents cannot adjust their consumption in the event
of a consolidation and their presence mitigates the positive wealth e¤ect induced by the scal
contraction. To explore this channel, we incorporate in our model a fraction of non-optimising
household members, which we set in our calibration equal to 44% in accordance with household
surveys for Italy reported by Martin and Philippon (2014). As shown in the bottom panel of
Figure 7, output and unemployment e¤ects are amplied and welfare gains are mitigated, as
expected.
4 Policy Evaluation
Given that the model is able to replicate qualitatively the empirical responses of output, unem-
ployment and tax evasion in Italy, in this section we employ it in order to quantify the e¤ects of
actual scal consolidation plans proposed and implemented in recent years. In particular, we re-
calibrate our model for Greece, Spain and Portugal, all countries which are implementing sizeable
consolidations and which are characterized by high corruption and tax evasion. In this section we
consider both the e¤ects of the consolidation plans on the size of the shadow economy, and also
measure their output, unemployment and welfare e¤ects.
For this exercise, in order to replicate the actual consolidation plans proposed in these coun-
tries, we allow both policy instruments, g and n, to move simultaneously so as to bring the actual
debt-to-GDP ratio down to the target after 10 years. We x the relative contribution of expen-
diture cuts and revenue enhancements based on the estimates of OECD (2012), which contains
details of recent scal consolidation plans for many OECD countries. Thus, for each country, we
set a policy mix in which a fraction a of the reductions in decit comes from expenditure cuts,
and (1  a) from revenue enhancements.
Table 5 summarises the values that di¤er in the calibration for the four economies of interest.
The size of both informal employment and corruption is higher in Italy and Greece, relative to
Spain and Portugal and the same is true for the debt-to-GDP ratios.17 These two countries
17Given the absence of data for informal employment in the countries other than Italy, we use the information
regarding the relative size of the shadow economy across countries, provided by the estimates of the share of shadow
output in Elgin and Öztunal¬(2012), to infer the relative size of informal employment. We use lower values for the
corruption parameter for Spain and Portugal following the evidence from the World Bank Control of Corruption
Index presented in Appendix A.
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also have smaller labor force participation rates, while the size of the government consumption
expenditures as a percentage of GDP is higher in Italy but lower in the other countries. In terms
of the consolidation packages, the mix between expenditure cuts and tax revenue increases looks
similar across the four economies, except for Spain that was dominated by expenditure cuts.
The results are shown in Figure 8.18 The high level of the debt-to-GDP ratio in Italy and
Greece implies that the required changes in taxation and government consumption spending and,
thus, decit, are larger in these countries. As a result, after the scal consolidation, output
drops and the shadow economy increases by more in Greece and Italy. The same is true for
unemployment. Although the output and unemployment responses in Italy and Greece are similar,
Italy is the only country that su¤ers welfare losses in the medium run, as we saw in Figure 6.
This is due to the lower share of expenditure cuts in the consolidation mix, a = 0:5, and therefore
the higher increase in the tax rate, seen in the bottom left graph. In the other countries, scal
consolidations induce welfare gains. These welfare gains are higher in Portugal and Spain, where
the lower debt-to-GDP ratio implies smaller scal consolidations. For that reason, the e¤ects
on output, unemployment and the shadow economy are qualitatively similar but quantitatively
smaller than in Italy and Greece.
As we saw previously, the presence of ROT consumers or utility enhancing government expen-
ditures can modify the predictions of the model regarding the welfare e¤ects of scal consolidations.
For this reason, we examine the sensitivity of our policy evaluation conclusions when we incorpo-
rate these two features in our analysis. We use estimates for the fraction of ROT consumers across
the four countries from Martin and Philippon (2014), setting this parameter to 65% for Greece,
44% for Italy, 54% for Spain and 50% for Portugal. For the case of utility enhancing spending,
we again set 1 = 0:85 and 2 =  0:25 for all countries. The responses of welfare in each case
are shown in Figure 9.
The introduction of rule-of-thumb consumers overturns our previous policy evaluation conclu-
sions. First, the consolidation plans are associated with welfare losses for all countries, although
it is again true that Spain and Portugal are less a¤ected relative to Italy and Greece. If we take
into account the presence of nancially constrained individuals in the economy, Greece is the big
loser from scal consolidation among these countries since its share of rule of thumb consumers
is substantially higher relative to the other countries.
As expected, if government spending is assumed to complement private consumption, the
welfare losses from scal consolidations are large for all the countries we consider since in this
case both spending cuts and tax hikes negatively a¤ect welfare. Under this scenario, the welfare
losses from scal consolidations are comparable in Greece, Italy and Portugal and are somewhat
smaller in the case of Spain, since the debt-to-GDP ratio is smaller in this country and smaller
sacrices are needed to meet the debt target.
Given the emphasis in recent years on deterring tax evasion and corruption hand-in-hand with
carrying out scal consolidation, it is interesting to ask whether such reforms can change the
18Note that here we plot the deviation from steady state in levels, meaning, for example, that a value equal to
1 on the vertical axis does not signify 101% of steady state, but rather 1 unit above steady state. In this way, we
control for the di¤erent steady states across countries, and responses are comparable.
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Figure 8: Simulation of Fiscal Consolidation Mix
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Figure 9: Welfare E¤ects of Fiscal Consolidation Mix: Sensitivity Analysis
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Figure 10: Welfare E¤ects of Fiscal Consolidations Counterfactual Analysis
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e¤ects of the consolidation plans currently being implemented. In order to investigate this, we
use our model to carry out a counterfactual experiment. In particular, we again simulate the
scal consolidation plans for the four economies, this time assuming that the auditing probability
for tax evasion is double that of the previous calibration. Figure 10 depicts, for each country,
the welfare losses in the baseline calibration with solid lines and when the auditing probability is
higher with dashed lines. We see that since output losses are mitigated, for all of the countries,
welfare gains are amplied. Moreover, the medium-run welfare losses in Italy become welfare
gains, given that ghting tax evasion implies lower hikes in the tax rates needed to achieve the
targeted consolidation.
In a similar manner, we carry out a counterfactual experiment, this time reducing by 50%
the embezzlement rate, and so reducing the extent of corruption, in the underlying economies.
Welfare losses are depicted with dotted lines in Figure 10. Reducing corruption improves welfare
during the consolidations for all countries and most signicantly so for Italy, where medium run
welfare losses become very small, and Greece, since these two countries are calibrated to have a
higher degree of public corruption. These results suggest that there should be an emphasis on
ghting public corruption, particularly in the time of a consolidation, since output losses can be
mitigated and welfare gains can be amplied signicantly when healthier public institutions are
in place.
5 Concluding Remarks
Cross country regressions suggest clearly that accounting for both tax evasion and corruption
is key to understanding the e¤ects of scal policy. Through a New Keynesian DSGE model
with involuntary unemployment, an underground sector and corruption, we have been able to
show that the presence of tax evasion and corruption amplies the contractionary e¤ects of tax
based consolidations, whilst it mitigates the e¤ects of expenditure based ones. Moreover, the
type of scal consolidation a¤ects the incentives of agents to produce in the shadow sector. In
particular, expenditure based consolidations reduce the size of the shadow economy, whilst tax
based consolidations increase it. These results match VAR evidence for Italy for which data on
informal employment exists.
Given the models ability to reproduce qualitatively the data patterns, we proceed to analyse
the output, unemployment and welfare e¤ects of actual scal consolidation plans in Italy, Greece,
Spain and Portugal. Fiscal consolidations imply sizeable output and unemployment losses in
Greece and Italy, both because these countries are characterized by higher level of public cor-
ruption and tax evasion, and also because the debt burden in these countries is higher, requiring
higher sacrices to achieve consolidation. Our policy conclusions depend on which assumptions
one is willing to take on board as more realistic for describing these four economies. If government
spending is assumed to be wasteful and we further assume that all agents are optimizers in the
economy, Italy stands as the only loser from the scal consolidations in the medium run, because
its consolidation mix relies more heavily on tax hikes. If we are willing to accept that some of the
government spending cuts involve goods that are complements to private consumption, then the
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welfare losses from austerity are large for all countries and Spain is the country su¤ering the least
from these packages because its scal adjustment was limited. Finally, if we assume that agents
are nancially constrained in these countries, as suggested by Martin and Philippon (2014), then
scal consolidations involve welfare costs for all countries and these are higher for Greece and
Italy.
Given the recent policy concerns about the reduction of both tax evasion and corruption in
Europe and the commitment of politicians to reduce both, we perform a counterfactual exercise
in order to evaluate the impact of such reforms on the output, unemployment and welfare losses.
The model predicts that ghting both public corruption and tax evasion should be at the top of
the list of reforms government should pursue in order to reduce the costs of scal consolidations.
We view our exercise as a rst attempt in analysing the e¤ects of corruption and tax evasion
on the size of the scal multiplier. Our model is stylistic and we have left out many important
aspects that could a¤ect our conclusions. For example, in our economy we consider a representative
household and we cannot assess the e¤ects of tax evasion and corruption on income inequality.
Also, we consider only cuts in government consumption expenditures and not in other items of
the government budget. Similarly, we consider only hikes in labor income taxes and not in other
sources of tax revenue. Furthermore, our framework does not allow for tax evasion on consumption
taxes, which is present in many economies. Finally, we do not endogenize the degree of public
corruption and we do not make it interact with aspects of the political economy, such as the
existence of two major predominant parties in the countries under consideration. We leave these
issues for future research.
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A Additional Figures
Figure 11: Shadow Economy and Corruption in European Countries
Shadow Economy (% GDP), Average over 1999-2010
Source: Schneider and Buehn (2012).
Control of Corruption Index, Average over 1998-2010
Source: World Bank Global Governance Indicators.
Note: The dotted line indicates the average for the countries considered.
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Figure 12: Empirical IRFs for Expenditure Based Consolidation - Sign Restrictions with Output
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Figure 13: Empirical IRFs for Tax Based Consolidation - Sign Restrictions with Output
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Figure 14: Empirical IRFs for Expenditure Based Consolidation - Cholesky Decomposition with
Output
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Figure 15: Empirical IRFs for Tax Based Consolidation - Cholesky Decomposition with Output
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B Derivations
B.1 Households maximisation problem
We can write in full the Lagrangean for the representative households maximisation problem.
Firstly, we can incorporate the composition of the household, equation (7), as well as the denition
of the total e¤ective consumption bundle, directly into the utility function of the household. Then,
we can plug the denition of the matches mjt =  
hj
t u
j
t into the law of motion of employment in
each sector, and also replace it in the budget constraint using the law of motion of private capital.
Then we are left with 3 constraints, and the following Lagrangean:
L = E0
1X
t=0
t
(
[1(ct)
2 + (1  1)(gt)2 ]
1 
2
1   + 

1  ut   nFt   nIt
1 '
1  '
 ct
h
(1 +  ct)ct + kt+1   (1  )kt +
!
2

kt+1
kt
  1
2
kt +
Bt+1t+1
Rt
  rtkt
 (1  nt )wFt nFt   wIt nIt  $(1  st)ut  Bt  pt + Tt
i
 nF t
h
nFt+1   (1  F )nFt    hFt (1  st)ut
i
 nI t
h
nIt+1   (1    I)nIt    hIt stut
i)
(32)
The controls are ct, kt+1, Bt+1, nFt+1, n
I
t+1, ut and st. The rst order conditions are:
[wrt ct]
cc
(1  2)
t 1c
(2 1)
t   ct(1 +  ct) = 0 (33)
[wrt kt+1]
ct

1 + !

kt+1
kt
  1

  Etct+1
"
1   + rt+1 + !
2
 
kt+2
kt+1
2
  1
!#
= 0 (34)
[wrt Bt+1]
 ct 1
Rt
+ Etct+1
1
t+1
= 0 (35)
[wrt nFt+1]
 nF t   Et
h
l 't+1   ct+1(1  nt+1)wFt+1   nF t+1(1  F )
i
= 0 (36)
[wrt nIt+1]
 nI t   Et[l 't+1   ct+1wIt+1   nI t+1(1    I)] = 0 (37)
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[wrt ut]
 l 't + ct$ + nF t hFt (1  st) + nI t hIt st = 0 (38)
[wrt st]
 nF t hFt ut + nI t hIt ut   ct$ = 0 (39)
Equations (33)-(35) are the arbitrage conditions for the returns to consumption, private capital
and bonds. Equations (36) and (37) relate the expected marginal value from being employed in
the each sector to the wage, accounting for the income tax in the regular sector, the utility loss
from the reduction in leisure, and the continuation value, which depends on the separation prob-
ability. Equation (38) states that the value of being unemployed (rather than enjoying leisure),
ct$, should equal the marginal utility from leisure minus the expected marginal values of being
employed in each sector, weighted by the respective job nding probabilities and shares of jobseek-
ers. Equation (39) is an arbitrage condition according to which the choice of the share, st, is such
that the expected marginal values of being employed, weighted by the job nding probabilities,
are equal across the two sectors.
We can dene the marginal value to the household of having an additional member employed
in the two sectors, as follows:
V hnF t 
@L
@nFt
= ctw
F
t (1  nt )  l 't + (1  F )nF t (40)
= ctw
F
t (1  nt )  l 't + (1  F )Et(V hnF t+1)
V hnI t 
@L
@nIt
= ctw
I
t   l 't + (1    I)nI t (41)
= ctw
I
t   l 't + (1    I)Et(V hnI t+1)
where the second equalities come from equations (36) and (37) respectively.
B.2 Derivation of the resource constraint
Consider the households budget constraint:
(1 +  ct)ct + it +
Bt+1t+1
Rt
 rtkt + (1  nt )wFt nFt + wIt nIt +$uFt +Bt + pt   Tt (42)
Recall the governments budget constraint:
Bt+1t+1
Rt
 Bt = DFt
Plugging this into (42):
(1 +  ct)ct + it +DFt  rtkt + (1  nt )wFt nFt + wIt nIt +$uFt + pt   Tt (43)
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Recall also the denition of the decit:
DFt = gt +$u
F
t   (1  TR)

(nt + 
s
t )w
F
t n
F
t + 
c
tct + Tt
  pxt xt
Plugging this directly into equation (43):
(1 +  ct)ct + it + gt +$u
F
t   (1  TR)

 ctct + (
n
t + 
s
t )w
F
t n
F
t + Tt
  pxt xt =
rtkt + (1   nt )wFt nFt + wIt nIt + $uFt + pt   Tt
Cancelling out the taxes and unemployment benets, we have:
ct+ it+gt pxt xt = rtkt+(1+(1 TR) st  TRnt )wFt nFt  TR ( ctct + Tt)+wIt nIt +pt (44)
Recall now that (i) the price of the nal good is normalised to 1, (ii) the retail rms turn xt units
of the intermediate good into yt units of the nal good, and (iii) the di¤erentiated retail goods
are costlessly aggregated into the nal consumption good. Then by denition, the prot from the
retail rm can be written as:
pt = yt   pxt xt (45)
Substituting this into equation (44), we obtain:
ct+it+gt = rtkt+(1+(1 TR) st TRnt )wFt nFt  TR ( ctct + Tt)+wIt nIt +yt (1 )pxt xt (46)
The price of the intermediate good, pxt , is determined by the zero-prot condition of the interme-
diate goods producing rm. That is, it satises:
(1  ) pxt xt| {z }
Revenue of intermediate rms
  (1 +  st )wFt nFt + wIt nIt + rtkt + FFt + IIt | {z }
Costs of intermediate rms
= 0
Plugging this into equation (46):
ct + it + gt = rtkt + (1 + (1  TR) st   TRnt )wFt nFt   TR ( ctct + Tt)
+wIt n
I
t + yt  

(1 +  st )w
F
t n
F
t + w
I
t n
I
t + rtkt + 
FFt + 
IIt

(47)
Cancelling terms we have:
ct + it + gt = yt  
 
FFt + 
IIt
  TR   ctct + Tt + ( st + nt )wFt nFt  (48)
Rearranging terms we get the nal expression:
yt = ct + it + gt + 
FFt + 
IIt + 
TRTRt
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B.3 Derivation of the wages
For each sector j = F; I the Nash bargaining problem is to maximize the weighted sum of log
surpluses:
max
wjt
n
(1  #j) lnV hnjt + #j lnV fnjt
o
where V h
njt
and V f
njt
are dened as:
V hnF t = ctw
F
t (1  nt )  l 't + (1  F )nF t (49)
V hnI t = ctw
I
t   l 't + (1    I)nI t (50)
V f
nF t
 @Q
@nFt
= (1  ) pxt (1  F )
xFt
nFt
  (1 +  st )wFt +
(1  F )F
 fFt
(51)
V f
nI t
 @Q
@nIt
= (1  ) pxt (1  I)
xIt
nIt
  wIt +
(1    I)I
 fIt
(52)
The rst order conditions of these optimization problems are:
#F (1 +  st )V
h
nF t = (1  #F )ct(1  nt )V fnF t (53)
#IV hnI t = (1  #I)ctV fnI t (54)
Plugging the expressions for the value functions into these FOCs, we can rearrange to nd ex-
pressions for wFt and w
I
t . Using (49), (51) and (53), we can solve for w
F
t , which yields:
wFt =
(1  #F )
(1 +  st )
 
(1  ) pxt (1  F )
xFt
nFt
+
(1  F )F
 fFt
!
+
#F
ct(1  nt )

l 't  (1 F )nF t

(55)
Similarly using (50), (52) and (54), we can solve for wIt , which yields:
wIt = (1 #I)
 
(1  ) pxt (1  I)
xIt
nIt
+
(1    I)I
 fIt
!
+
#I
ct

l 't   (1  I)nI t

(56)
C Calibration strategy
We calibrate the model using annual data on the Italian economy over the period 1982-2006.
C.1 Formal Labor market
We calibrate the labor-force participation and the unemployment rates that are related to the
formal market to match the observed average values from the data. We set lf  nF + uF = 60%
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and u
F
lf = 10%. Then using denitions we can get:
uF =
uF
lf
lf
nF = lf   uF
We x the separation rate, F , equal to 0:07 and we can derive:
mF = FnF
and
 hF =
mF
uF
Since there is no exact estimate for the value of the formal vacancy-lling probability,  fF , in the
literature, we use what is considered as standard by setting it equal to 0:96. Hence, we can also
derive:
F =
mF
 fF
We set the matching elasticity with respect to vacancies, 2, equal to 0:7, close to the estimate
for Italy in Peracchi and Viviano (2004). Then the matching e¢ ciency parameter for the formal
sector can be set to satisfy:
F1 =
mF
(F )2 (uF )1 2
C.2 Formal Production
We set the capital depreciation rate, , equal to 0:088. Then we derive ik :
i
k
= 
Following the literature, we set the discount factor, , equal to 0:96. Next, we get R:
R =
1

and
r = R  1 + 
The elasticity of demand for intermediate goods, , is set such that the gross steady-state markup,

 1 , is equal to 1:25, and the price of the nal good is normalized to one. Then p
x is determined
46
by:
px =
  1

We set the TFP parameter in this sector AF = 1 and the capital share F = 0:34. We set the
probability of audit and the fraction of total prots paid as a ne in the event of an audit as
follows:  = 0:02, which is close to the value used in Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), and  = 0:3.
Then we can obtain from the rmsFOC with respect to capital:
yF
k
=
r
(1  ) pxF
From the production function in the regular sector we have:
nF
k
=
1
AF

yF
k
 1
1 F
Using denitions we can then obtain:
k = nF

nF
k
 1
; yF =
yF
k
k; i =
i
k
k
We set the vacancy costs in the formal sector F = 0:14 and the payroll tax rate  s = 0:16 close
to the value used in Orsi et al. (2014). Then we have:
wF =

(1  ) px(1  F )y
F
nF
  (R  1 + F ) 
F
 fF

=(1 +  s)
C.3 Informal Production
We set the TFP in the informal sector AI = 0:25 and I = 0:8. Using Istat data we set n
I
n = 0:13
and we can derive:
nI =
nI
n
1  nIn
nF
Then by denition we have:
yI = (AInI)1 
I
; y = yF + yI
C.4 Informal Labor Market
We set the exogenous job destruction rate in the informal sector I = 0:0545. We denote by ~I
the total steady state separation rate in the underground sector, that is:
~I  I + 
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Then we have
mI = ~InI
Then we set  fI = 0:05 and get:
I =
mI
 fI
We set the vacancy cost in the informal sector I = 0:13 and derive
wI = (1  ) px(1  I)y
I
nI
  (R  1 + ~I) 
I
 fI
C.5 Fiscal Variables
Next, we set the replacement rate, $
wF
, equal to 0:35 close to the estimates in Martin (1996), also
used by Fugazza and Jacques (2004). Then by denition:
$ =
$
wF
wF
We set government spending and the tax rates as follows: gy = 11%, 
n = 0:4, in line with Orsi et
al. (2014), and  c = 0:18. Then by denition:
g =
g
y
y
We set the steady state debt-to-GDP ratio from the data, b = 103% and using the law of motion
of debt-to-GDP we derive
DF
y
= (   1)b
and by denition
DF =
DF
y
y
We set the corruption parameter TR = 0:2. Then using the denition of the decit we derive
TR =
g +$uF   pxy  DF
1  TR
Then using the resource constraint we have:
c = y   i  g   FF   II   TRTR
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and from the denition of tax revenues we have
T = TR  (n +  s)wFnF    cc
C.6 Household
We set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1 , equal to 0:5 and the weight of private
consumption in e¤ective consumption, 1 = 1 for the case of wasteful government spending. For
the case of utility-enhancing spending we set 1 = 0:85 and 2 =  0:25, so that private and
public spending are complements. This gives us the consumption bundle by denition:
cc = [1(c)
2 + (1  1)(g)2 ]
1
2
and also:
c =
cc(1  2)1c(2 1)
1 +  c
We then use the following three equations:
[1  (1  F ) +  hF ]nF = c

(1  n)wF   u
F
uF + uI
$

[1  (1  ~I) + m
I
uI
]nI = c

wI   u
F
uF + uI
$

nI
mI
uI
= nF 
hF + c$
to solve for the three unknowns nF , nI and u
I . This gives us, by dention:
 hI =
mI
uI
l = 1  lf   nI   uI
u = uF + uI
s =
uI
u
I1 =
mI
(I)2 (uI)1 2
We set the value of leisure in the utility function, ', equal to 2. Then we can derive  to satisfy:
 =

c$ + nF 
hF

l'
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We set the bargaining power parameters in the two sectors to satisfy:
#F =

F1   wF

F1   
F2
#I =

I1   wI

I1   
I2
where 
F1 
h
(1  ) px(1  F ) yF
nF
+ (1 
F )F
 fF
i
=(1+ s), 
I1 
h
(1  ) px(1  I) yInI + (1 ~
I)I
 fI
i
,

F2 

l '   (1  F )nF

= (c (1  n)), 
I2 

l '   (1  ~I)nI

=c:
C.7 Other Parameters
The steady state debt-to-GDP target is set equal to the actual debt-to-GDP ratio, b = b = 103%.
In order to achieve a 5% drop in the debt-to-GDP target 10 periods after a shock, we set 1 = 0:85
and 2 = 0:0001. We set the ination targeting parameter in the Taylor rule,  = 1:1, the capital
adjustment costs ! = 3 and the price-stickiness parameter  = 0:25. Finally, we set the parameters
of the scal policy rule in each case to ensure that we meet the target after 10 periods (see Table
4).
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